Government Communications Security Bureau annual report 1986 (a rare top secret document)

[Cover page]

TOP SECRET copy No. 1 of 16

GCSB ANNUAL REPORT 1985/86

Warning: this document contains information which is not to be communicated or made available to any person other than those officially listed as being authorized to see such material.

TOP SECRET

[inside cover]

TOP SECRET

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY (X2)

INTRODUCTION TOP SECRET UMBRA

  1. This report, the eighth since the formation of the GCSB in September 1977, reviews the activities of the bureau over the period 1 April 1985 to 31 march 1986.
  2. Prominent developments during the year were:
  1. The commissioning of Phase 1 of the Government Secure Telephone Network (Project Paragon).
  2. The revision of national cryptographic access procedures.
  3. Assumption of responsibility for advice to government on computer security matters.
  4. Exclusion of the GCSB from the 1985 Allied Far East SIGINT Planning Conference and other effects of the Anzus question.
  5. The Intelligence Review.
  6. The establishment of a formal working relationship with Defence covering Defence EW/Tactical SIGINT.
  7. Technical satellite trials at Tangimoana.
  8. Hosting of the 1985 Intelligence Technical Security Conference (INTECSEC 85)
  9. The provision of a Comint reading service for the Prime Minister.
  10. The loss of Japanese diplomatic cover occasioned by improved Japanese Comsec measures.

P1 COMINT TOP SECRET UMBRA

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

General

3. GCSB relations with NSA, GCHQ, CSE and DSD continued to reflect the ongoing political impasse between the US and NZ. The bureau’s SIGINT partners have recognised the importance of the community’s professional relationship but an element of caution became evident in exchanges involving the GCSB.

While the provision of SIGINT to the GCSB continued, albeit at a reduced level, the Allies were unwilling to broaden their SIGINT contacts with NZ until our difficulty with the US had been satisfactorily resolved. Overseas SIGINT training is particularly affected.

  1. Comsec relationships on the other hand are little affected. Information exchange, equipment procurement activity and working level contact with all agencies continued unaffected throughout the reporting period.
  1. Unfortunately TECSEC liaison between the GCSB and US Department of State and other US agencies has been sharply curtailed. The absence of a US delegation at INTECSEC 85 was visible evidence of the degraded TECSEC relationship. TECSEC relations with the Commonwealth countries remain close.

INTECSEC 85

  1. The second joint conference of allied TECSEC agencies was hosted by the GCSB in late November 1985. Delegations from Australia, The UK and Canada attended, with observers from Foreign Affairs and the NZSIS.
  2. The meeting was noteworthy for the very frank exchange of information on techniques and operational experience that took place. The opportunity for working level consultation and exchange which this forum continues to provide is highly valued. The next conference is to be hosted by CDCS in Ottawa in 1987.

AUSTRALIA

  1. close relations between the GCSB and DSD continue, served well by effective liaison. Workign contact was also maintained with a number of other Australian governmental and technical commercial interests.

P3 COMINT TOP SECRET UMBRA

  1. A total of 22 GCSB and 15 NZ Defence personnel attended a variety of DSD courses during the reporting period. Assistance was also provided for Defence personnel attending electronic warfare (EW) training at Australian Defence Force facilities.
  2. The first two GCSB graduates trained at DSD returned to NZ in early 1986. Bother performed creditably. A third graduate is undertaking similar training.
  3. DSD continued to act as the bureau’s primary channel of cryptologic communications and again provided facilities for the annual production of NZ national cryptographic key materal.

THE UK

  1. Collection of Argentine naval and Egyptian diplomatic communications on GCHQ’s behalf was maintained through the year while the bureau relied heavily on GCHQ acquisition and forwarding of French Pacific satellite intercept. The tour of GCHQ of a senior GCSB officer as an integrated member of the GCHQ management team continued to mutual advantage. Valuable assistance was again provided by GCHQ’s cryptanalytic advisor to DSD on the selection of bureau cryptanalyst recruits. However the prospect of training cryptanalysts at GCHQ was reserved pending the outcome of the Anzus question.

THE US

  1. The bureau’s relations with NSA evolved over the period into a mixed state of official cautiousness and private cordiality. As a result of pressure from the US Administration, NSA was forced to introduce a ban on new SIGINT initiatives and on all visits betweeb GCSB and NSA, an injunction which forced the cancellation of visits to GCSB from, amongst others, the deputy director of NSA and the senior NSA representative to the Pacific region. On the other hand the NSA agreed in mid 1985 to GCSB’s request that the tour of the seconded NSA officer serving as the bureau’s deputy director for policy and plans be extended one year.
  2. Following the 1 march 1985 US presidential directive, the distribution of US SIGINT to NZ was reduced. This loss continues to have a marked effect on the NZ intelligence community.

P4. TOP SECRET UMBRA

  1. A severe setback to NZ SIGINT planning occurred when NSA was directed to withdraw the GCSB’s invitation to attend the joint AUSCANZUKUS Far East SIGINT planning conference in Washington in October 1985. The conference identified replacement systems and locations for current joint operations in Hong Kong but no future role was reserved for the GCSB in the process.
  2. The GCSB liaison officer at NSA (Dr WH Tucker) consolidated his position during the year while expanding to include wider contacts with NZ posts in Washington and New York. Dr Tucker’s on-the-spot assessments and reports enabled accurate and timely decision making over the period of strained US/NZ relations after March 1985. Of particular note was the efficient handling of government’s KY-71A (STU-II) buy and the bureau’s purchase on favourable terms of a variety of computer and other technical equipment through NSA.

CANADA

  1. relations with CSE remain close with further enhancement through the cross-crediting of the GCSB liaison officer in Washington to Ottawa. CSE contributed technical papers in support of the bureau’s Defence EW/Tactical SIGINT programme and Canadian SIGINT collection provided some input to the bureau’s reporting coverage of Soviet and Polish Antarctic activities.

THE GCSB’S VISITS SCHEDULE 1 APRIL 1985 – 31 MARCH 1986

  1. Visitors from overseas during the year included:
  1. from Australia:

Mr K Barnes, ADC, DSD

Mr J Noble, ADD, DSD

Mr I Doherty, CHR, DSD

Mr GR Harber, ATSS, DFA

Mr W Daish, ATSS, DFA

P5 CONFIDENTIAL

  1. From the UK:

AM Sir Michael Armitage (KCB, CBE), CDI

Dr JR Johnson, DR, GCHQ

Mr DE Leweson, SBOM

Mr P Mason, CTSD, FCO

Mr NL Allen, CTSD, FCO

  1. From the US:

Mrs K Eckles, NSA

Mr J Wilson, NSA

Mr B Unkenholz, NSA

Mr R Hanson, SUSLOM

  1. From Canada:

Mr AD Small, High Commissioner, Wellington

Mr K Stone, CSE

Mr G O’Bright, CSE

Mr CJ Coulombe, CDCS, External Affairs

Mr DJ Lamothe, CDCS, External Affairs.

  1. Overseas visits by senior GCSB staff over the same period included:
  1. Mr CM Hanson, Director, to GCHQ, CSE, DSD and NSA
  2. Mr CK Smith, Dep Director, to GCHQ and DSD
  3. Mr J Willson, Dep Director, to DSD and ATSS

P6 CONFIDENTIAL

  1. Mr DE Hill, Dep Director, to Canada (RCMP, CSE), the UK (CCTA, UKSS and GCHQ), to the US (NBS, NSA)
  2. Mr IMC Howie, Asst Director, to DSD
  3. Mr NG Catley, Asst Director, to DSD
  4. Mr PR March, Asst Director, to CDCS, Ottawa and NSA
  5. Mr BM Punnett, Asst Director, to DSD

P7 CONFIDENTIAL

THE INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

  1. The review of the functions of the external intelligence bureau, which was commissioned by the government in early 1985 was expanded during the year to include the GCSB. Bureau staff were briefed on the review’s objectives and progress by the chair of the Committee of Controlling Officials.
  2. The review committee’s final recommendations were expected to be presented to government early in the 1986/87 year.

P8 TOP SECRET HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

ADMINISTRATION

  1. In July 1985 the SSC reviewed the bureau’s grading and management structure, and exercise which had been delayed due to the wage freeze. The recommendations of the review which were adopted after being approved by the chairman, SSC, determined the appropriate relativities at the various management levels. Those relativities were unfortunately again upset by the results of the 1985 public service wage round.

FINANCIAL SUMMARY

  1. The approved expenditure for the FY 1985/86 was as follows

85/86 84/85

($000)

Personnel 6813 5693

Travel, transport and communicats 897 797

Maintenance, ops upkeep, rental of

Property and equipment 185 145

Material, supplies, services 625 310

Other operating costs 30 22

Capital – works 113 68

– equipment 981 549

Total $9,644 $7,584

  1. On 13 March 1986 the PM approved the bureau’s FY 1986/87 Estimates at the level of $13,238,000.
  2. The annual audit of the Melbourne imprest account and the liaison office disclosed a continuing high standard of finacial accounting and staff administration.

P9. TOP SECRET HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

SUMMARY OF STAFFING

  1. Bureau strength against approved establishment as at March 1986 was as follows:

Establishment Strength

Head Office 69 61

Tangimoana 68 65

Overseas 46 39

Total 183 165

  1. In addition the following staff were employed by or paid by the bureau:

Seconded staff from

Overseas agencies – 2

Seconded military

Officers – HO – 1

– overseas – 1

Wage workers

(cleaners, couriers) 7 6

Total 13 16

  1. The disparity between the approved establishment and the current strength is indicative of continuing recruiting difficulties coupled with the delays in processing pre-employment clearances.

NON-SPECIALIST STAFF TRAINING

  1. In addition to technical and SIGINT training, bureau staff completed a selection of internal staff supervisory and junior management courses. A senior GCSB officer also attended the senior staff course at the RNZAF command and staff college. In compliance with the SSC review of the bureau, a greater number of GCSB staff will participate in SSC and other recommended management courses.

P10. CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY

  1. The reporting period saw the implementation of most of the recommendations of the 1984 security survey of GCSB Head Office and the Tangimoana station. The bureau’s security management shows steady improvement following the March 1985 appointment of a fulltime security officer. There were minor security problems stemming from free public access to the Defence building where the bureau’s HO is located but these were satisfactorily resolved as they occurred.
  2. The first edition of a periodic GCSB security newsletter was produced in August 1985. This was followed in September by comprehensive GCSB security instructions. A bureau-wide security education programme was also instituted during the reporting period.

SECURITY INCIDENTS

  1. The Peace/Anti-nuclear movement maintained its interest in the GCSB throughout the year, with emphasis on the operation of Tangimoana station. Elements of the movement protested at or were identified in the immediate area of the station on four occasions. All incidents passed peaceably with no adverse effects on station operations.

P11. COMINT TOP SECRET UMBRA

THE SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMME

HIGHLIGHTS:

  1. Prominent events included:
    1. The exclusion of the GCSB from the Allied Far East SIGINT planning conference.
    2. The establishment of a formal working relationship with Defence on EW/Tactical SIGINT.
    3. The use of NZ SIGINT resources subsequent to the bombing of the Rainbow Warrior.
    4. The reduction of Japanese diplomatic reporting consequent to the introduction of a new Japanese cypher system.
    5. The limiting of NSA SIGINT end-product provided to NZ customers through the GCSB.

FAR EAST SIGINT PLANNING CONFERENCE

  1. NSA withdrawl of the bureau’s invitation to the Far East SIGINT Planning Conference in late 1985 was a major blow to GCSB SIGINT planning. Considerable efforts went into the bureau’s preparations for the conference, which promised to provide a unique insight into future quinquepartite SINGIT operations in the Pacific.

EW/TACTICAL SIGINT

  1. In February 1986 a policy covering GCSB relations with Defence or EW/Tactocal SIGINT matters was agreed by the Defence Electronic Warfare Committee. Defence requirements are:
  1. Guidance and assistance concerning SIGINT security, collection and processing
  2. Comint and ELINT end-product support and liaison with collaborating SIGINT agencies.

P12. COMINT TOP SECRET UMBRA

  1. Technical assistance to include EW/Tactical SIGINT training, advice on equipment and the establishment of a national ELINT database for Defence/Services use.

Functional responsibility for execution of this policy was placed with the deputy director for SIGINT operations (DDO).

  1. GCSB basis courses in SIGINT skills commenced in June 1985 for Service personnel en route to DSD for further training.
  2. National ELINT collection requirements were issued to the RNZAF and RNZN in early 1986. Both services now contribute through the GCSB to the DSD ELINT database. In turn the combined production of regional ELINT collection is periodically distributed to NZ Defence EW customers.

P13. COMINT TOP SECRET UMBRA

SIGINT COLLECTION

  1. heavy emphasis was placed during the year on the search for and development of potential targets of national interest audible at Tangimoana. This task was in addition to the refinement of cover already instituted. Although fundamental to all SIGINT operations, search and development assumed greater importance as:
    1. Greater use of more sophisticated modes of transmission (eg microwave, satellite) had contributed to the relative allied neglect of the HF portion of the signals environment database worldwide; current technical information might not therefore be readily available in times of crisis.
    2. In the event of NZ losing access to all US SIGINT and collection assistance a very heavy burden would fall on GCSB collection facilities and:
    3. A NZ signals environment database essential for independent operations is not yet complete.

TANGIMOANA

  1. The station covered the following tasks during the reporting period:
    1. French South Pacific civil, naval and military.
    2. French Antarctic civil.
    3. Vietnamese diplomatic.
    4. North Korean diplomatic.
    5. Egyptian diplomatic.
    6. Soviet merchant and scientific research shipping.
    7. Soviet Antarctic civil.
    8. Soviet fisheries.
    9. Argentine naval.

P14. COMINT TOP SECRET UMBRA

  1. Non-Soviet Antarctic civil.
  2. East German diplomatic.
  3. Japanese diplomatic.
  4. Phillipine diplomatic.
  5. South African Armed Forces.
  6. Laotian diplomatic.
  7. UN diplomatic.
  8. Morse search and development.
  9. Technical search (non-Morse).
  1. The station intercepted 165,174 messages from these targets; an increase of approximately 37,000 on the 84/85 figure.
  2. Technical search, using MARBURG equipment on loan from NSA, contributed an average of 528 items a week to the allied and GCSB databases. Very favourable reports on the quality of this input was received from overseas.

SPECIAL ASSISTANCE TO GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

  1. The Rainbow Warrior Incident.

A special collection and reporting effort was mounted against French vessels in the NZ area, particularly the yacht Ouvea. NSA and GCHQ were also requested to monitor certain Paris telephone addresses. Coverage of the Ouvea produced some valuable intercept.

  1. Greenpeace.

The Greenpeace protest action against French Pacific nuclear testing was closely followed for French reaction. This watching brief continued for safety purposes during the vessel’s abortive Antarctic expedition.

  1. The Marshal Nedelin.

This Soviet space event support vessel, a newcomer to the region, entered NZ maritime surveillance area in support of a Soviet space shot. GCSB HFDF was used to asisst RNZAF surveillance of the vessel. The operation was successful.

P15. TOP SECRET UMBRA COMINT

  1. The Mikhail Lermontov.

Specific sections of the ship’s bridge log, the captain’s log and the engine room log were passed to Defence (GCSB) for translation for the Dept of Transport marine enquiry.

P16. TOP SECRET UMBRA COMINT

GENERAL

46. 1984/85 saw a 33% growth in GCSB’s SIGINT reporting over the previous year despite staff changes. The introduction of a new Japanese high grade cypher system in November 1985 effectively denied the GCSB and Allied SIGINT community 80-90% of access to Japanese dimplomatic sources. Serious gaps also emerged in French Pacific cover through the re-routing of French communications throughout the Pacific.

THE SOVET TARGET

  1. Reporting on the Soviet target increased by 20% on the previous year. Emphasis remained on Soviet fisheries and scientific research shipping and Soviet Antarctic operations. The 482 reports issued covered:
    1. Fish catch data from Soviet vessels in the NZEEZ.
    2. The activities of Soviet fishing expeditions in the SE Pacific, South China Sea, Kiribati, Southern Indian Ocean and Antarctic waters.
    3. The activities of Soviet fisheries and oceanographic research vessels in the Pacific, Indian and Southern Oceans.
    4. The Soviet Antarctic science programme.
    5. Soviet commercial activities in the NZ/South Pacific area.
    6. Naval-related commercial exercises contacted by Soviet fisheries/merchant vessels.
  1. The bulk of the raw traffic used in Soviet reporting was derived from the Tangimoana collection, with contributions from DSD (fisheries), NSA (telex), GCHQ (Antarctic) and CSE (Antarctic).

P17. TOP SECRET COMINT UMBRA

SOUTH PACIFIC ISLAND STATES

  1. Reporting on items of intelligence derived from South Pacific telex messageson satellite communications links was accelerated during the year. A total of 171 reports were published, covering Solomons, Fiji, Tonga and international organisations operating in the Pacific. The raw traffic for this reporting provided by NSA.

THE JAPANESE TARGET

  1. The Japanese government implementation of a new high grade cypher system seriously reduced the bureau’s output based on Japanese diplomatic sources. A solution to the problem is not expected in the short term. Although 238 reports were published, output was down on 1984/85 and some retasking of production resources was necessary while most of the raw traffic used throughout the year came from GCHQ/NSA sources.

THE FRENCH TARGET

  1. Key French Pacific communications systems underwent important change during the reporting period. A significant fall-off in available Gendarmerie traffic occurred in May/June 1985 and thereafter. This led to a loss of continuity on political intelligence at an important period in French Pacific relations.
  2. Some progress was made on improving analyst knowledge of Mururoa nuclear test activity and the bureau was able to predict testing with some degree of accuracy. Useful work was also done on voice intercept. Valuable information was recovered from that source during the Rainbow Warrior incident. Activity in the French Antarctic remained at a low level.
  3. The bulk of the raw material for the 601 reports published was provided by GCHQ with increasing supplementation from Tangimoana.

OTHER REPORTING

  1. Among the small number of reports issued covering other topics were some on selected non_Soviet Atarctic research activity (eg Indian, Polish), UN matters and

P18 COMINT TOP SECRET UMBRA

[continues]

Chinese and other government traffic derived chiefly from GCHQ/NSA satellite intercept.

CRYPTANALYSIS

  1. The bureau’s first cryptanalyst completed his basic cryptanalysis training at DSD with distinction and continues in-house studies at GCSB. A second cryptanalyst was selected and is expected to join the bureau in 1986.

Precise plans for two years of advanced training by both officers at one of the allied SIGINT agencies was deferred due to some uncertainties and reservations among certain allies over the Anzus issue and its final outcome.

P19. TOP SECRET UMBRA COMINT

SIGINT DISTRIBUTION

  1. Beginning in March 1985 the Anzus issue had 3 major effects on the flow of SIGINT end product into NZ from the other members of the SIGINT community through the GCSB, namely:
    1. Material for NZ was addressed to the GCSB only. Other NZ addresses were deleted.
    2. All SIGINT summary reports from US forces were cancelled.
    3. CSE, GCHQ and DSD were asked by NSA to exclude all US content from material provided to NZ.
  2. While GCHQ, CSE and DSD have consequently developed special “sanitized” reports and assessments for NZ, the net effect of the US measures was a reduced SIGINT service to NZ customers. That US SIGINT continued to be sent to NZ at all became a matter of considerable sensitivity and owed much to the depth of the professional relationship between the GCSB and the rest of the SIGINT community.

SENIOR OFFICIALS READING SERVICE

  1. A special Comint reading service was set up during the year for the PM. The service was subsequently extended to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Similar arrangements are planned for the Chief of Defence staff and the Secretary of Defence.

P20. SECRET, HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

SIGINT TRAINING

TANGIMOANA

  1. The station conducted basic collection orientation courses for four recruit radio officers, reorientation/familiarization courses for radio officers on return from Australia and other introduction/refresher training as required. Training included 3 12-week courses on technical search, technical SIGINT for operators replacing skilled personnel posted overseas.

HEADQUARTERS/OVERSEAS STAFF

  1. Two HQ officers completed basic reporting courses and one officer underwent basic cryptanalyst training at DSD. One officer attended university Chinese language training in Wellington.
  2. 19 of the bureau staff attached to DSD/JTUM attended DSD courses.
  3. A senior bureau officer continued on the job training attachment to GCHQ. This attachment includes substantial exposure to SIGINT policy development and planning as well as considerable UK field station contact.

P21. TOP SECRET, HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

MANPOWER ENGAGED IN SIGINT ACTIVITIES

Strength at April 1, 85 strength at 31 Mar, 86 Est March 86

DCU Tangimoana 66 65 68

Melbourne

– liaison 2 2 2

– radio officer (DSD) 8 8 8

– radio officer (JTUM) 25 25 25

-service officers (DSD) 1 1 –

-grad trainees (DSD) 3 1 1

Washington

– liaison 1 1 1

Cheltenham

– training 1 1 1

Wellington

– management/processing 24 22 29

– service attachments 2 2 –

Total 133 128 135

P25. CONFIDENTIAL

THE COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY OF TECHNICAL SECURITY PROGRAMMES

GENERAL

  1. Most of the Comsec and Tecsec objectives set for 85/86 have been met. Major projects which will continue into the coming year are the development of a national key tape production facility (Project DELTA) and the further automation of the national Comsec accounting system.

POLICY AND PROCEDURES

  1. A significant relaxation of NSA policy of the classification of Comsec equipment occurred during the year. While the new policy was expected to facilitate equipment installation and use, the improved security of future systems increased the need for secure handling of key material. This development received considerable study during the year, resulting in a substantial review of the cryptographic access procedures.
  2. The national rules for cryptographic access were subjected to a 3-year mandatory review and several recommendations for minor changes were made for the approval of the Prime Minister.

PUBLICATIONS

  1. The review of Comsec standards and procedures continued through the year. Two publications were revised and the new ones issued.

GOVERNMENT COMMUNTICATIONS SECURITY COMMITTEE

  1. The GCSC met four times during the reporting period. Principal topics for consideration were:
    1. A review of the committee’s terms of reference.
    2. A review of the future Comsec operating environment with subsequent recommendations to the CCO on revised cryptographic access procedures and
    3. Arrangements for the procurement, installation, operation and maintenance of equipment to complete the Government Secure Telephoen Network (Project Paragon).

P23. CONFIDENTIAL

The committee was also addressed by a senior NSA Comsec advisor on current and future aspects of Comsec.

NATIONAL DISTRIBUTING AUTHORITY (NDA)

  1. An unprecedented quantity of Comsec material was handled by the NDA during 1985/86. More than 11 tonnes of inward material, comprising 7 tonnes of key material and 4 tonnes of other Comsec material and equipment was received, most of which was issued to NZ udders. Unfortunately little progress was made on the development of a computerized Comsec database and accounting system. The project continued to be handicapped by a lack of additional computer storage facilities and suitably trained staff. Further consideration will be given to this problem in 86/87.

PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MATERIAL

  1. As in previous years the annual production of NZ national key material was undertaken under GCSB control at DSD Melbourne. DSD facilities will be required for national key production again in 1986 and in the future for the production of key systems which continue to use manuscript key material.
  2. Work on the establishment of a national key tape production facility at GCSB (Project Delta) continued through the year. Key perforation and printing equipment designed and manufactured by GCSB staff was commissioned together with sonic welding and packaging equipment. Software development continued at a more measured pace.
  3. Considerable delays resulted from a lack of familiarity with computer systems and faults in the systems. These difficulties were overcome and the facility is expected to be operational by the end of 86.

GOVERNMENT SECURE TELEPHONE NETWORK

  1. Phase 1 of the Government Secure Telephone Network (Project Paragon) was commissioned in Jan/Feb 1986 with the successful installation of STU-II (KY 71A) equipment in Parliament buildings, ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, Treasury, NZSIS, the Canberra and Washington posts and GCSB. Phase 1 will completed with installations in London and NZFORSEA Singapore in mid 86.

P24 CONFIDENTIAL

  1. For Phase 2 a further 34 STU-II equipments were ordered to complete the network within NZ and to selected overseas posts. Delivery is expected to start mid-86 and installation will be ongoing through the latter half of 86 and throughout 87.
  2. The establishment of the secure telephone network represents a significant achievement in the government communication security programme and will enhance the government’s communications capability.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

  1. Subscribing to Abraham Lincoln’s adage of “not doing for people that which they can do for themselves” the bureau attaches considerable importance to its training role.
  2. The Comsec education and training programme was formalised with the issue of an annual training course synopsis and course forecast in Nov 1985.
  3. Formal courses on Comsec accounting STU-II and KG-84 maintenance and operation and an introduction to TEMPEST and TEMPEST field testing were run through the year. A total of 91 students attended from Foreign Affairs, the PM’s dept, Defence, Treasury and NZSIS. A variety of Comsec and Tecsec briefings were also provided on an as-requested basis for Foreign Affairs, Defence, customs and police.
  4. GCSB officers attended a number of overseas courses in STU-II maintenance, TEMPEST field testing and communications centre installation and cable tracing in the US, UK, Australia and Canada respectively. Tecsec staff completed a two-week course in building construction at Wellinton Polytech. Staff involvement in a variety of in-house and extra-mural courses continued.
  5. An officer from the RNZ corps of signals began a year’s attachment to the Comsec policy and management group in Oct 85. This attachment is proving mutually beneficial. The bureau arranged for Defence staff to attend Comsec installation and KW-46 (VALLOR) maintenance courses in Australia and the US respectively.
  6. The marked increase in both formal and informal Comsec training highlighted the bureau’s need for a purpose-built training room. The subject will be addressed in the coming year.

P25. CONFIDENTIAL

COMSEC/TEMPEST INSPECTIONS

  1. Communications facilities at Beijing and Washington were inspected and tested for TEMPEST hazards. A further 7 facilities were inspected within NZ.
  2. While Defence assumed increased responsibility for the inspection of service installations, the bureau continued to advise on TEMPEST and provide an inspection service to departments with no organic inspection capability.

TECSEC INSPECTIONS

  1. 15 overseas posts and 11 establishments in NZ were inspected. Support was also provided to the local Canadian and British high commissions.
  2. The bureau provided input to a Foreign Affairs reassessment of threat of technical attack on overseas posts. As a result of this study an increase in the inspection programme is indicated for the coming year.
  3. Tecsec staff took the opportunity afforded by overseas travel on inspection duties to liaise informally with Allied Tecsec agencies in Australia, Canada and the UK. Such contact continues to be vital and the maintanence of up to date Tecsec countermeasures against hostile attack.

EQUIPMENT

  1. In the period up to 1990 practically all current cryptologic systems in use by NZ will be replaced by new systems, mostly of US origin. Both Foreign Affairs and Defence will commission significantly enhanced communications systems which will have sophisticated communications security features. Defence will replace virtually all of the current tactical communications systems by 1990. Other departments are looking increasingly towards improving their levels of communications security.
  2. In light of these programmes the bureau continues to be heavily involved with departments in the selection and procurement of suitable Comsec equipment, which GCSB arranges through the appropriate allied Comsec agency.
  3. A 3-day visit by an NSA KW-46 demonstration team was arranged by the bureau for Defence. User trials will be conducted on the KW-46 by the RNZN in late 1986.

P26. CONFIDENTIAL

  1. During the year the bureau received a sub-surface interface radar (SIR) equipment which maps the strata of material including soil and building structures, and will be used to detect irregularities in various media. An initial familiarization course on SIR in Nov 85 was attended by selected Tecsec staff from GCSB with inspectors from the Australian Technical Security Service and Canadian diplomatic communications service. The SIR will assist in the location of unauthorized surveillance devices and will enhance the capability of the Tecsec group. The equipment will be deployed overseas early in the coming year, probably to Beijing.

OBJECTIVES FOR 1986/87

  1. The Comsec and Tecsec programmes for 86/87 will continue to implement the bureau’s responsibility for policy formulation, promulgation of standards, doctrine, instructions and procedures, cryptographic advice, training and support provision of key materiual, provision of a Comsec and Tecsec inspection service and liaison with allied agencies.
  2. Particular objectives will be:
    1. Commencement of national key tape production (Project Delta)
    2. Extension of the government secure telephone network in NZ and Overseas (Paragon).
    3. Continued review of Comsec standards with emphasis on personal, physical and emission security.
    4. Further development of the GCSB Comsec education and training programme.
    5. Further automation of the NDA Comsec accounting system.
    6. Improvement of the TEMPEST field testing and capability, and
    7. Provision of a higher level of Tecsec inspection to meet an anticipated increased threat from technical attack on overseas posts.

P27 [has no security warning]

THE COMPUTER SECURITY PROGRAMME

GENERAL

  1. The bureau’s computer security responsibility approved by the PM in Oct 84 was staffed and became active in May 85.

INITIAL DEVELOPMENTS

  1. The division’s first task was to define the national computer security problem. A survey of 26 government departments was conducted and common concerns identified. The survey confirmed a widespread awareness of computer security issues within departments and a growing interest in the availability of national computer security policy, standards and guidelines.

COMPUETER SECURITY POLICY

  1. In early 86 an interim summary of computer security principles was complied and promulgated through the interdepartmental committee on security (ICS). The paper included an explanation of the bureau’s computer security responsibility.
  2. Agreements were also reached with the ICS for the production of a series of publications – NZ Security Information Technical Standards – for issue by the ICS. The first of these, entitled Security of Computer Applictions: a general guideline, was approved for publication by ICS in March 1986. The preparation of 5 other volumes in the NZSITS series is well advanced.

COMPUTER SECURITY LIAISON

  1. The bureau was active through the year in providing computer security advice direct to government departments and agencies, to include:
    1. Foreign Affairs on computeer security aspects of the department’s overseas secure communications network and internal computer systems.

P28 [no warning]

  1. Customs on aspects of the CASPER and CRIS systems and the security of a personal computer for sensitive information.
  2. Defence on security of the Porirua computer.
  3. Reserve Bank on access controls and the vulnerability of their main financial transactions systems.
  1. An understanding was reached between the bureau and ICS, NZSIS and the SSC to ensure computer security developments occurred in concert and remained unaffected by devolution of controls on the procurement and operation of departmental computer resources.
  2. The reporting period saw a growth in liaison between the GCSB and allied oragnisations and agencies concerned with the full range of compueter security applications.

P29. TOP SECRET HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

COMMUNICATIONS, DATA PROCESSING AND ENGINEERING

COMMUNCIATIONS

  1. The GCSB communications centres handled 235,052 messages during 85/86, a small reduction on 84/85 figure of 239,632. Midway through the year it became evident that the workload in the communications centres had exceeded the capability of the single man shift system. By reducing operation time to 16 hours per day and instituting 2-man shifts, the level of stress on staff was noticeably reduced. However the allied SIGINT community is a 24-hour operation and reduced operational hours in NZ continue to create problems. This will be addressed in 86/87.

100. The 600 baud channel between GCSB and DSD continued to provide an excellent timely service. However the capacity of the 61.1 baud channels from GCSB to Tangimoana and to DSD were such that severe limits were placed on traffic flow rates. Message jams on the DSD data channel in particular often occurred.

Plans to upgrade those slow speed channels inn 86/87 were postponed due to budgetary restraints.

EQUIPMENT PURCHASE/DEVELOPMENT

  1. An 800 line per minute band printer purchased in March 86 substantially improved the utlisation rate of the bureau’s PDP 11/23 computer assigned to SIGINT processing.
  2. Procurement action began in late 85 through NSA for 10 additional R-2174 HF receivers for Tangimoana and four Tempest-qualified IBM PC XT microcomputers for GCSB cryptanalyst and SIGINT analyst/reporter use. Purchase through the NSA in this fashion proved substantially cheaper than using commercial or military channels.
  3. Following the success of the initial purchase of BLUEGRASS demodulation equipment from DSD, preparations were in hand for the assembly of additional units at Tangimoana.

ENGINEERING PROJECTS

  1. The recovery of 3 rhombic antennas from Waiouru to Tangimoana was completed in March 86 with MWD and NZPO assistance. A programme to measure the field strength patterns of the antennas was started using an improvised kite-borne transmitter. Preliminary results suggest that design goals had been achieved.

P30. TOP SECRET HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

  1. An experimental HF vertical log Periodic antenna (VLPA) was constructed at Tangimoana to test the bureau’s ability to design and construct low-cost high performance antennas to meet urgent operational requirements. The results of the experiment indicated that both the computer model and the mechanical concepts were viable.
  2. Analysis of the results of project NIMBUS, an engineering study which was conducted in early 86, proved conclusively that satellite transmissions of intelligence value to NZ can be satisfactorily intercepted at Tangimoana.

REGIONAL HFDF

  1. The HFDF facility at Tangimoana is capable of providing a line bearing to a target transmitter but is unable to provide an accurate transmitter location. Such a capability is a valued component of maritime surveillance, search and rescue and SIGINT operations. Joint scientific studies with the Defence Scientific Establishment commenced in mid 85 to examine the requirements of an effective South Pacific region HFDF system. These investigations will continue into the coming year.

DATA PROCESSING STAFF

  1. The recruitment during the year of an experienced programmer/systems analyst should enhance the development of bureau data processing systems.

P31. [no warning]

  1. Notwithstanding the uncertainties evident throughout the year flowing from the review of intelligence, the Anzus issue, staff shortages and personnel changes, all divisions of the GCSB have surpassed their efforts of previous years.
  2. This report clearly demonstrates that the GCSB is developing into a highly professional organisation, spanning a number of different but inter-related intelligence and security disciplines.

CM Hanson

Director

30 May 1986

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